From Redi Ametllari
At first glance, everything may seem normal: a business making payments, an individual buying land, a company receiving remittances from abroad, or a family investing in real estate. But when these transactions come together like pieces of a puzzle, they produce a narrative of a whole different story.
Frequent deposits into personal accounts, millions of euros flowing through newly created companies, properties purchased at very low prices and resold a few months later for several times higher amounts, villas worth millions financed by jurisdictions with fiscal advantages or companies that are created and disappear within a few months.
These are some of the patterns that emerge from the analysis of suspicious cases referred for investigation, taken from the Annual Report of the Financial Intelligence Agency for 2025 (AIF). They show how money can move through various channels, trying to take on a legitimate appearance through commercial activity, investments or ping-pong movements between bank accounts. On the other hand, the level of sophistication of these schemes also speaks to the quality of the analytical work of the AIF, which has managed to identify, analyze and structure these cases into clear typologies of suspicious activities.
Ping-pong worth 1.9 million Euros between bank accounts
In one case, a citizen had deposited around 300 euros into his accounts over a two-year period. But when the accounts of nine other people linked to the activity were also analyzed, the total amount of funds deposited amounted to around 1.9 million euros.
Some of these people had family connections. The money did not stay in the accounts for long. Some of it was transferred to prepaid cards and used to purchase luxury brand products online in various countries.
The account also received an amount of 350 thousand Euros as a VAT refund through the companies "Planet Tax Free" and "Global Blue Tax Free". This money was also used for purchases.
But the main problem was another: the person at the center of this scheme had registered a company with the purpose of "selling clothing online", while the company had declared zero income and was deregistered only a few months later.
Land that is bought cheaply and sold for hundreds of thousands of euros
Real estate is another area where unusual financial models become more visible and is now a cliché typology. Specifically, a citizen had continuously invested in real estate from 2021 to 2025. In total, it involved tens of thousands of square meters of land in different areas of Tirana and Kavaja.
Some of the properties were purchased at relatively low prices, ranging from 4 to 21 euros per square meter. But two particular transactions are particularly noteworthy. A 6,200 m² plot of land was purchased for just 30 thousand euros and, a few months later, was sold for 423 thousand euros. Another 1,850 m² property, purchased for 15 thousand euros, was resold for 180 thousand euros. So, in a few months, a property purchased for a relatively small amount turned into hundreds of thousands of euros. Meanwhile, the same person had also created a company in the construction and excavation sector. Through it, other significant land areas were acquired, while the company's financial activity grew rapidly. It is not only the price of the property that raises questions here. It is the pattern: many properties, low-value purchases, quick resales, related companies and the movement of funds between the individual and the business.
An 18-year-old and a 1.5 million Euro villa
In 2025, an 18-year-old citizen bought a seaside villa worth 1.5 million euros. The financing came from her sister, who lived in a tax-friendly jurisdiction. The funds for the purchase had been transferred from a bank account in a southern African country considered to be at increased risk for corruption and the informal economy. But this was not the only purchase.
In the same year, the sister bought another villa on the coast, worth 1.7 million Euros, while during the first half of the year she invested about 700 thousand Euros in works of art. In the documents, part of the funds was related to dividends received from companies operating in the online gaming sector in foreign jurisdictions. However, international verifications brought other data: one of the companies had been deregistered since 2023, while the citizen's husband was linked to illegal activities of an organized crime nature. In such cases, the problem is not automatically the fact that the money comes from abroad or that the investment is made in real estate. The main question is how clear and verifiable the origin of the funds is and how much it matches the real economic activity of the persons and companies involved.
11 companies, 3.7 million euros and a common model
The repertoire of cases also results in a more sophisticated practice: the creation of a network of companies that are different entities on documents, but in practice operated as one. 11 Albanian companies had benefited from around 3.74 million Euros from different countries in Europe and Asia. All of them operated in the online marketing sector. The analysis showed that the same individuals appeared in different roles: as administrators, partners or persons with the right of representation. Another common feature was their longevity. Most were created during 2024 and some were deregistered only six months later. On the outside, they look like 11 normal companies. On the inside, a network of people, activities and operating periods that were repeated. Even the companies that sent money from abroad showed unusual elements. Some had a turnover much higher than the declared income, some used bank accounts only as transit channels, while in other cases the funds were immediately transferred to other countries. Some of the Albanian companies were subsequently referred for investigation on suspicions of concealing income and non-payment of taxes and duties.
When a POS turns into a channel for millions of euros
One of the most unusual cases involves the use of card payment terminals (POS). A company, whose main activity was the trade of goods, installed two POS at the end of December 2024. Immediately after activation, the terminals were tested with a card issued in Belgium. Just two days later, the company's account was credited with 96 thousand euros through the POS, of which 83 thousand euros were withdrawn. On December 31, another transaction of 152 thousand euros was made. On the same day, a transaction of 790 thousand euros was also attempted, but was blocked by Mastercard.
In total, the completed and attempted transactions amounted to around 1 million euros. The company justified the funds with invoices for services provided to a Belgian company: escort, rental cars and VIP cars. But here too there was a problem: these services did not match the activity that the company had been carrying out over the years. Just a month before the transactions, it had added the activity of a tourist and travel agency to its premises. The case raised suspicions of a possible card fraud scheme and the use of invoices to justify transactions with an unclear economic basis.
What unites all these cases
These cases may be different, but their common denominator is the element of inconsistency, unfolding in several dimensions:
between declared income and the money in circulation; between the company's activity and the services it bills; between the age or economic profile of the person and the value of the investment; between the purchase price and the resale price of the property; between the lifespan of a company and the amounts it circulates. And, above all, between what the document shows and what the financial trail shows. This is precisely why the analysis of money laundering cases cannot be based solely on a suspicious transaction.
It is easy to point the finger of criticism at banks, notaries, tax administration or other institutions when a suspicious case comes to light. At first glance, many of the signals may seem clear. But the real challenge lies elsewhere: a single signal, seen by a single institution, is not necessarily the whole picture.
An unusual deposit may be explainable to the bank. A sales contract may be formally regular to the notary. A tax return may not seem problematic to the tax administration. A property transaction may be just one of hundreds of records held by a public institution. But when this data is put together, a pattern may emerge that is not apparent from any single link.
This is where the importance of cooperation and information sharing lies. If a bank reports suspicious activity, but the information remains only in the banking channel; if a notary sees a series of unusual transactions, but it is not linked to financial data; or if the tax administration sees discrepancies between declared activity and financial turnover, but these signals are not combined with information from other actors, each institution may only see part of the story.
The cases analyzed by the AIF show precisely the need to view the system as a whole. The effectiveness of the fight against money laundering is not measured only by the number of suspicious reports, but also by the ability of public and private actors to connect these reports, data and signals with each other.
