The world's major autocracies – China, Russia, Iran and North Korea – are increasingly relying on each other's resources, military capabilities and geopolitical influence to withstand Western pressure.

For Washington, the strategic dilemma is no longer simply whether these four countries are cooperating, but the extent to which their alignment is changing the balance of power on several fronts simultaneously.

The urgency of this issue has become clear on the front lines in Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Russia used North Korean ballistic missiles in an August 11 attack on the city of Zaporizhia that killed seven people and injured dozens. The attack came amid reports that a North Korean missile unit, equipped with up to 120 ballistic missiles, has begun deploying in western Russia.

Meanwhile, Pyongyang tested another ballistic missile on August 11, just days before major U.S.-South Korea military exercises, prompting a joint response from the U.S. and 40 other countries. The situation highlights the dual security pressures facing Washington and its partners in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.

David J. Kramer, executive director of the George W. Bush Institute and former senior U.S. diplomat, told Radio Free Europe (RFE/RL) that although cooperation between these four states – increasingly referred to by the acronym CRINK – is now operational, it does not reach the level of a formal alliance, comparable to NATO.

"It's operational and selective," Kramer told REL.

This assessment reflects a reality that is increasingly gaining support among policymakers in Washington: CRINK is neither a tightly integrated military bloc nor simply a term used for rhetorical convenience. Rather, it functions as a flexible network, in which members cooperate where their interests align, enabling each regime to improve some of its strategic weaknesses.

The war in Ukraine has become an important arena for the exchange of military capabilities between CRINK members.

Iranian-designed Shahed drones played a key role in Russia's offensive campaign during the early stages of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched by Moscow in February 2022.

Meanwhile, North Korea's involvement in the conflict has expanded significantly. Pyongyang has sent troops to support Moscow's war effort, with estimates rising from an initial figure of 12.000 to 15.000 soldiers, to reports suggesting the number could be as high as 50.000, while North Korea has also supplied Russia with ballistic missiles.

Practical cooperation
China's role remains less direct in military terms, but it is still important.

Beijing has helped finance Russia's war by buying energy from Russia, while also providing Moscow with dual-use technology.

"All of these countries have supported and reinforced each other," Kramer said.

The cooperation also creates opportunities for military learning and technology transfer. Kramer noted that Russia has developed its own version of the Iranian Shahed drone, while North Korea has benefited from sending troops and missiles and is likely receiving technology from Russia in return.

The four countries do not have a common defense treaty, a unified command structure or a binding strategic doctrine, and analysts say there does not appear to be any ideology that binds them beyond their opposition to the West, particularly their opposition to the US-led order.

“This cooperation has already yielded results, supporting war efforts, propping up regimes embroiled in conflicts, and undermining democratic norms. However, its reach is limited: the grouping is transactional, lacking a common leadership and divided by competing interests, without a shared plan for an alternative order,” according to analysts at the Lowy Institute, an international policy think tank based in Sydney, Australia.

China remains the dominant partner in its relations with Moscow, leaving Russia much more dependent on Beijing than vice versa.

China has not gone so far as to offer the level of direct support that the Kremlin might have sought when the two countries declared "borderless" friendship in 2022.

Beijing is also closely watching Russia's deepening relations with North Korea, a development that Kramer said China is not pleased with.

However, these differences have not hindered practical cooperation.

"I think this presents a bigger challenge, because where they seem to be united is in trying to weaken, whether it's neighboring states, democracy or particularly the role and credibility of the United States," he said.

This does not make CRINK a unified geopolitical bloc. On the contrary, its members have proven to be able to identify areas of common interest and offer support to each other when doing so serves their individual strategic goals.

Kramer points to BRICS, noting that efforts to bring together a broader group of countries in a unified way have not been successful. In contrast, CRINK has been more effective when its members identify specific “favorable objectives” and areas where they can strengthen each other.

Washington's position
This broader perception of the threat is reshaping the debate in Washington, where lawmakers and national security analysts are increasingly viewing regional conflicts through an interconnected strategic lens.

Republican Senator John Curtis, of Utah, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, emphasized that the results in Eastern Europe have direct strategic consequences for deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.

"Allowing Putin to win in Ukraine would have a dramatic impact on many other areas of the world," Curtis told REL, referring specifically to Beijing's ambitions toward Taiwan. "There's no doubt they're watching our response."

Senator Rick Scott, Republican of Florida, expressed the same view, telling REL that defeating Russian aggression is key to preventing a broader network of authoritarian states.

Retired Admiral Mark Montgomery, senior director of the Center for Innovation in Technology and Cybersecurity at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and co-author of the book Axis of Aggressors, told REL that his research has documented more than 600 cases of cooperation between the four countries.

Montgomery offered a stark opinion: Ukraine is effectively facing elements of all four adversaries simultaneously. Tehran has supplied drone capabilities; Pyongyang has provided troops and ammunition; Beijing has supplied dual-use components, while Moscow has offered tactical experience and appears to be offering military technology in return.

This creates an adaptive system. Since each member can help compensate for the economic, technological, or military weaknesses of another member, pressure on one country can be partially alleviated through cooperation with others.

Meanwhile, Moscow and Beijing have used tools such as vetoes at the United Nations and other actions to block international efforts to pressure their partners.

Dealing with the network
CRINK, however, is not invincible, according to analysts.

The lack of a formal alliance structure is one of the sources of its vulnerability.

China has its own interests and has limited the extent of direct military support it provides to Russia. Beijing is also concerned about deepening relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, while the four countries do not have a unified strategic doctrine.

Kramer argued that the US and its allies should respond by cooperating more closely in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, rather than treating the threats posed by the four states as separate problems.

He called for more aggressive action, such as using the Global Magnitsky Act, which allows the US to impose sanctions on officials and others involved in serious human rights abuses and corruption. He said broader sanctions could also be used more aggressively against the four regimes.

But Kramer stressed that military aid to Ukraine remains key to the West's response.

"Supporting Ukraine with military assistance is absolutely vital," he said, referring to Russia's continued attacks with cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, as well as Ukraine's urgent need for interceptor missiles.

The first test of the West's resolve remains focused on Ukraine, where the lack of air defense systems leaves civilians and infrastructure vulnerable to Russian attacks with Iranian-designed drones and North Korean missiles.

The consequences extend beyond Europe. Kramer noted that Taiwan is among Ukraine's biggest supporters because Taipei understands that how the West responds to Russia's war will be important for how China views Taiwan.

This creates a strategic link between the European and Indo-Pacific fronts. The United States and its allies may face geographically distinct crises, but the governments behind these challenges are increasingly capable of supporting each other.

As Washington faces threats in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East, treating each front as a separate problem risks overlooking the ways in which Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea can reinforce each other.

CRINK does not need to become a formal alliance to pose a significant challenge to Western interests. As Kramer's analysis highlights, its members need only continue to identify pragmatic areas where cooperation can strengthen each of them in the face of what they perceive as pressure from the US and its allies.