By GIORDANO BRUNO GUERRI

Memorie.al / “Albania, Ciano's fiefdom”, publishes unknown details. Here is what the Italian Minister wrote in his diary three days before the invasion. Why were the pages of the personal diary censored: – In the months after the landing, it was not difficult to notice the progressive transformation of the character Jacomoni, who was undoubtedly an excellent “navigator” among the “shallows” of the Albanian situation, quickly complicated by the war, and by the “torpedoes” that occasionally arrived from the Foreign Ministry, where the Albanian cabinet was headed by Zenone Benini, a close friend of Ciano, a helpful and pleasant companion.

Jacomoni maneuvered with style amidst these difficulties and at the same time patiently and inconspicuously, despite the clumsiness of some of the characters in his cabinet, built the figure of the viceroy, indispensable in a country with a more or less monarchical tradition. The unity was himself, although with Ciano's "procurement". He was the pillar and had long understood that his duty was to protect the Albanians and their culture from the fierce attacks coming from Rome.

In 1940, they set out from Rome, to balance the activity of Jacomoni (judged, especially after the outbreak of the war, too weak), a clumsy and completely fascist character, Piero Parini, initially the alter ego of the secretary of the Albanian Fascist Party and then the Secretary General in the office of the Viceroy. They had put guards on Jacomoni. But Parini did not understand at all what the Union meant for Jacomoni, according to the great models of personal unions.
Of course, the organization of the Albanian Fascist Party was based on the Italian model, without any visible results. But it was not only the party that did not function, or that functioned as an imitation of the Italian correspondent bodies. Albanian autonomy in reality no longer existed: the bodies of the Italian state made laws instead of the corresponding Albanian bodies and within a few weeks the Albanian state administration was destroyed, while the army and diplomacy were absorbed by the Italian ones.

The absorption of the diplomatic corps was not difficult since there were few who were more than happy to move into Italian correspondent roles. A transitional organization was created; the "Albania organization", from which several Italians who had been residents of Albania for a long time, with or without merit, immediately took advantage to secretly enter their careers. The most serious episode had to do with the absorption of the gendarmerie by the carabinieri, since the latter were dissatisfied with the fact that the surviving cadres of the Albanian gendarmerie wore uniforms and were adorned with ranks that were usually not so easy to obtain. The same thing happened with the army.

The way out was found by replacing the Italian stars with the helmet of Skanderbeg, on the uniforms of the Albanians. But not even two years passed and the government of Rome changed its mind: the Albanians, involved in a war that they did not ask for themselves, were no longer satisfied with money and careers, but sought and achieved the dissolution of the Albanian Fascist Party, the abolition of the department for Albania and the re-establishment of the army. By the beginning of '42, the war had already taken on a global character and things were not going so well for the Axis.

On January 9, 1942, Ciano published an article on Albania in the 'Giornale d'Italia', full of praise for the principle of nationality: "If we do not take into account the complex organicities of the different nationalities, we cancel out the positive forces. Otherwise, it would be like a farmer cutting the roots of a tree, believing that in this way he would strengthen the trunk and branches". From the first days, some prominent Albanians had expressed the desire to have Ciano as regent, others had even offered him the crown: "Ciano was very pleased - says Ernest Koliqi, who made the offer - perhaps he cherished the idea of ​​starting his dynasty precisely in Tirana".

Of course, this did not last, but even though he was not king in Tirana, Ciano behaved as such: in Rome, the 'Grand Duchy of Tuscany' was often used to refer to Albania, and the head of the police, Boçhini, forbade his officials "absolutely and categorically" to deal, in any way, with issues related to it, because: "Albania is Ciano's fiefdom and I do not want to have any problems with it". The Italian Minister in Greece, Grazzi, recalls that Ciano; "frequently visited Albania, received by the Viceroy's office as a sovereign; there he set up and furnished, with money taken from the state coffers, luxurious hunting reserves".

Even the city of Saranda was given its ancient name, "Porto Edda". Extraordinary sums were spent in vain in pursuit of a prestigious policy, as befits Ciano. It can be seen in the telegram to Jacomoni on February 3, 1940, in which he claims the reclamation of some marshy terrain, when fertile lands were left fallow: For the operation of "Italba" and the beginning of the agricultural reclamation of Albania, necessary also for political purposes that cannot escape them, it is necessary to make available to "Italba" itself, an appropriate amount of land.

"And since it turns out that in Albania there is a possibility of finding these lands, which will be paid for fairly, please immediately get to work on the individualization of waste lands that can serve this purpose and tell me about the further development of this matter, which is of an urgent nature. Keep me informed." Much less than this telegram would be enough to rightly raise suspicions of illegal things, fraud, bribery.

But I have not found any evidence for all this (just as the German agents did not find any, as we will see below), and it is difficult to bring charges against Ciano. It must be considered that Ciano's interests are centered on power and the fact that he is rich through his family. But it is also true that he was particularly sensitive to requests for favors from friends. Albanian oil – in which he was probably indirectly interested, as a shareholder of the ANIC and AGIP companies – was sulfurous, so it required expensive refining, so it was not a profitable business.

Moreover, very little was produced. Ciano's entire policy in Albania, before and after April 7, 1939, seems to be influenced by a school memory of the Risorgimento: the desire to annex territories to the homeland and the adjustment of the social and political status of the new citizens are the most visible signs of this influence. From now on, Ciano could be called, by Mussolini's supporters, a great statesman who made Italy even greater.

He felt proud of the Albanian issue and did not hide it, giving himself, without any hesitation, the credit for the fact that; “he gave Albania to Italy”. To understand how much he cared about the fatherhood of this story, it is enough to read the text of the discussion in the Chamber of Deputies on April 21, 1939, where he rarely refers to Mussolini and his “unbroken will”: Ciano speaks with pleasure with the term “we”. But even more interesting and significant than the discussion is the phone call he made immediately afterwards to Ansaldo, to whom the discussion was transmitted by telephone.

Secret fund for Albanian affairs

Since the actual annexation that Ciano would have wanted was not possible, for fear of reactions from the world of Albania, personal unification was chosen, instead of placing a prince of the Savoy family at the head of the Albanian state, because such a thing would have emphasized Albania's dependence on Italy. Ciano shows what this dependence consisted of on April 12, when he returned to Tirana to conclude the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly. At that time, he had at his disposal a secret fund for Albanian affairs of 5 million lire and 380 thousand Albanian francs, and so he went "to take bundles of Albanian francs", committing corruption and abuse of office.

The examples of corruption and mismanagement were so numerous that they became the norm. Ciano, who was not against these systems, has no problem accepting it: “We will give personal rewards, because personal gain often silences the noblest feelings…”; “A few decorations and a few posts were enough to carry out the operation of castrating Albania, without leaving the patient in a state of shock”. Jacomoni did nothing but continue to keep alive what had already become a tradition. Moreover, the new Italian-Albanian relations were imported in such a way as to create as much confusion as possible:

Jacomoni was appointed King's Viceroy, practically the Albanian head of state; but as a diplomat he still depended on the Italian Foreign Minister: it reached absurdity when Jacomoni signed, on behalf of Vittorio Emanuele III, an agreement with the Albanian government, that is, with his own government. A department was set up specifically for Albania within the Italian Foreign Ministry, entrusted to Zenone Benini, a childhood friend of Ciano's; then Piero Parini was sent to Tirana, as "assistant" to the secretary of the Albanian Fascist Party; he was a powerful minister, former director general of Italians abroad, a superficial person of the Starace type, but somewhat more cultured and with good organizational skills. Ciano governed Albania through these three characters.

The Duce complains to the King

A significant contrast is verified between Mussolini and his son-in-law, in the official titles to be given to Ciano for Albania. When, towards the end of May, the King thinks of giving Ciano the title of marquis on the occasion of the signing of the Pact of Steel, Mussolini changes his mind. Perhaps Mussolini did so because of his usual desire not to give too much glory to his subordinates, so as not to overshadow him, but it is possible that other reasons drove him to this decision. As he himself told Ciano, giving him a new title of nobility (within 15 years of granting his father's first title) would do nothing but damage his image in the eyes of the broad masses of the party.

It was precisely after the Albanian venture that Ciano gained the greatest chances with Mussolini as a "dolphin", so it was necessary not to distance him further from the party base, which - and the Duce knew it well - did not harbor sympathy for the "first son-in-law". The same considerations may apply to the issue of the Annunziata Necklace. According to the diary - but I believe that this time Ciano is not writing the truth - on August 6, Vittorio Emanuele III, informs Mussolini that he intends to award Ciano the "Order of the Santissima Annunziata", the highest royal honor, which automatically turns its holder into a "cousin of the King".

Ciano writes: “The Duce hesitated at first, since ‘the necklace might represent compromises that are better not to have’ but now he is convinced that it is better to have it, so tomorrow he will write a letter to the King about it”. The statement is partly true; in a word, it is true that Mussolini – at a time when he was thinking more and more seriously of getting rid of the monstrous monarchy – was of the opinion that he would protect his potential successor from the burden of a cousinship, which politically could even be mentioned in the not-so-distant future. But Ciano cannot resist, he wants the necklace even more than the title of marquis, and his “now he is convinced”, written in the diary, actually hides all the persuasive power he exerted on Mussolini to give his approval and stop opposing, which was even more open than Ciano shows.

D'Aroma gives a version of the event, according to which Ciano maneuvered with particular agility […] but Mussolini, upon realizing the ruse, immediately stopped everything even though the high title had to do with his son-in-law. We will say even more, one August morning he called Galeazzo and in a firm tone forbade him from accepting the Necklace. Galeazzo was not only very upset, but as stubborn and frivolous as he was, he immediately put into motion all the support and those family and political levers that he already had in his hands. Within a few days, in bad relations with his family, especially with his daughter Edda, Mussolini really decided to write to the King.

Other documents that I have found confirm the accuracy of D'Aroma's version and the falsity of Ciano's: It is not true what Ciano wrote, that Mussolini had written to the King to give him "authorization", on the contrary, he wrote a genuine request, more or less convoluted and detailed, from which the fact that the King had not even expressed his desire to give Ciano the high title comes to light.

Here is the text: "Your Majesty, upon returning to Rome, I was informed that on the occasion of the expansion of Italian territory, the 'Annunziata Necklace' was given to the acting Foreign Ministers. This is what happened after Libya, Rapallo, Fiume. Given this custom, an exception to Count Ciano would have an implication or would be interpreted in an unpleasant way. It is my duty to declare to Your Majesty that all the preparatory work from within is owed to Count Ciano, which made it possible for us to practically annex Albania, almost without a single rifle shot."

epilogue

It has been rightly written that the occupation of Albania has all the typical characteristics of a fascist enterprise: It is in contrast to certain legal and moral commitments, as well as to the entire preceding political direction; it places enormous economic problems on Italy's shoulders, which it finds unprepared to solve; it is presented to domestic public opinion as an increase in Italian prestige, achieved thanks to the ability and perseverance of the fascist regime; it is exploited by fascist hierarchs for their personal enrichment. And like other fascist enterprises – in Corfu, in Ethiopia, in Spain – it had the consequence of a profound shock to the whole of Europe.

Not simply because of the fact itself – which gave the impression of a wife’s kidnapping – but because Italy was again acting as a disturbing element. Immediately afterwards Great Britain and France guaranteed Greece and Romania their assistance against any reasonable attack, just as they had done with Poland after the Nazi invasion of Bohemia; Roosevelt for the first time intervened personally in European affairs, asking Italy and Germany to promise not to attack other independent nations.

Thus, the coalition that will defeat the Axis is connected and consolidated. For all this, Ciano – who has lost a good part of his credibility abroad with the events of April – is relatively worried. He is still convinced that he can control the alliance with Germany, and even deviate or abandon it. Six weeks after the capture of Tirana he will sign the Pact of Steel, and not even three months later Ribbentrop will tell him that Germany is thinking of starting the war.

Mussolini intercepts his son-in-law's phone calls

The phone call was intercepted and sent to Mussolini; here is the text:

Ciano: (in a loud voice) – Ansaldo!

Ansaldo: (in a sweet tone) – Commander, Your Excellency!

Ciano: – How does it look?

Ansaldo: – What, Your Excellency?

Ciano: – My discussion, of course!

Ansaldo: – Ah, yes, Your Excellency. I haven't read it yet. They are passing me the pages one by one, as soon as they decipher the transcript.

Ciano: – What do you think, based on what you've read?

Ansaldo: – Wonderful!

Ciano: – Is that all?

Ansaldo: – Embroidered, fascinating! It will have worldwide resonance. The presentation of the facts is unwavering, sunny, eminently logical.

Ciano: – Good! But make sure to highlight all of this in your comments. You know what? Write a better editorial. Keep in mind that the audience really welcomed me extremely warmly. In my entire life, I have never been so moved as I am today.

Ansaldo: – I believe so, Your Excellency. Do you want anything else?

Ciano: – Ansaldo!

Ansaldo: – Order, Your Excellency!

Ciano: – Be especially careful not to remove any of the parts of the interventions in the discussion text.

Ansaldo: – What are you talking about, Your Excellency?

Ciano: – For the applause, for the cheers of the crowd. Do you understand me?

Ansaldo: – Don't worry, Your Excellency!

Ciano: – Especially at the end of the discussion. The final applause! Look, I really had a lot. Highlight in bold! Don't spare the bold!/ Memorie.al