The comparison between tensions over the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Crisis of 1956 has become increasingly common in geopolitical analysis. The argument is simple: just as Suez marked the limits of British power after World War II, Hormuz could signal the limits of American hegemony in the 21st century.
However, parallelism remains problematic.
The similarity between the two crises is largely geographical. Both are linked to strategic maritime corridors and the control of global energy and trade flows. But the historical context, the structure of the international system, and the very nature of American power today are fundamentally different from that of Britain in 1956.
The real debate is not whether the United States is in a period of strategic transformation. Global powers are constantly repositioning themselves in relation to technology, energy, and changes in the international order. The question is whether Hormuz represents for America the same moment that Suez represented for Britain. So far, the evidence suggests that it does not.
One of the main reasons why the parallel between Hormuz and Suez remains limited is related to the different nature of British power in 1956 and American power today. The British Empire relied on territorial control, colonial administration, and physical dominance of trade routes. The loss of control over strategic nodes meant a direct weakening of the imperial structure itself.
The United States operates on a different model of power. American dominance after World War II was built not primarily on colonies, but on control of the mechanisms that keep the global economy running: the international financial system, the dollar, military alliances, technology, strategic supply chains, and naval superiority. For this reason, tensions over a sea corridor do not automatically produce the same strategic effect that Suez had on Britain.
This difference becomes even more apparent in the energy dimension. For Britain, the Suez Canal was a vital artery connecting the British economy to the colonies, markets, and energy sources of the empire. Any threat to the canal directly affected London's economic and strategic functioning.
Hormuz remains one of the world’s most important energy corridors, but it does not exert the same direct influence on the United States. Its influence on America passes mainly through European allies, Asian economies, and global energy markets. The United States itself is now much less dependent on energy imports from the Persian Gulf than it once was, thanks to domestic oil and gas production, as well as its growing role as an energy exporter.
In this sense, the destabilization of Hormuz does not necessarily produce an automatic weakening of the American position. In many cases, it increases the strategic dependence of allies on the military, financial, and energy presence of the United States.
The Hormuz crisis should not be seen simply as a regional crisis or as a moment of linear weakening of American power. On the contrary, recent developments suggest that Washington is also using the crisis as a mechanism to reconfigure alliances and consolidate its presence in global strategic corridors.
This becomes clearer if recent developments are read as part of the same strategic framework. American interest in Greenland is linked to the growing importance of Arctic corridors, which are becoming increasingly accessible due to melting ice. In the Indo-Pacific, expanding military cooperation with Indonesia increases American access to the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok — three of the most important Asian trade and energy supply corridors.
At the same time, strategic cooperation with Morocco strengthens American positioning near the Strait of Gibraltar, while developments in Venezuela are related to the effort to increase influence over global energy reserves and markets.
Taken together, these developments suggest a process of strategic repositioning rather than a simple withdrawal of American power.
Even the very concept of “crisis” helps to understand more clearly the nature of the current moment. The word comes from the ancient Greek krisis, which means “judgment,” “division,” or “moment of decision.” In international relations, crises often serve not only as moments of instability, but also as points where great powers redefine priorities and the architecture of security.
In this sense, Hormuz can be interpreted less as “America’s Suez” and more as part of a process where the United States is trying to guarantee control or security of the corridors through which energy, trade, and global supply chains pass.
This does not rule out the possibility that the American system will face limitations, challenges, or major transformations in the coming decades. But the linear parallel with Suez remains problematic, because it assumes that American power operates on the same logic as the European colonial empires of the 20th century: the logic of an era that is long over.
