By Dashnor Kaloçi

The events of the spring of 1981 in Kosovo, which began at the beginning of March with protests and demonstrations by student youth and then the people of Kosovo, who rose up to demand their legal freedoms and rights, as well as the status of the republic, just as all other peoples and ethnicities that were then in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had and enjoyed, led by the Bosniak Cvijetin Mijatović (Chairman of the Presidency, May 1980, May 1981), as is now known, had a harsh reaction from official Belgrade. The high leadership of Serbia at that time, headed by Prime Minister Ivan Stambolic (Chairman of the Executive Council of the Socialist Republic of Serbia), on which the Autonomous Socialist Province of Kosovo depended at the time, sent armored forces there and violently suppressed those protests, not only with police forces, but also by bringing the army and tanks into the streets and squares of Pristina and other cities where those peaceful protests took place, where during all those days (March 11 - April 11, 1981), there were a total of 12 victims.

These events, which became headline news in all the world media, as well as the public reaction of official Tirana, are now very well known from dozens of articles and archival documents that have been published mainly after the 90s, but what still remains a great enigma and has not been made known to this day is; how did the leader of communist Albania, Enver Hoxha, initially react to those events, what was his first impact on what was happening in Kosovo and what steps did official Tirana then take to come to the aid of its compatriots in the Autonomous Socialist Province of Kosovo? Did Enver Hoxha stick to what he had said in 1970, that Fadil Hoxha and the senior leadership of Kosovo were doing very well to be against Kosovo being granted the status of a Republic within the framework of the Yugoslav Federation, or had he changed his mind and his position?!

Regarding these etc., we are introduced to some archival documents located in the Central State Archives (the personal fund of Enver Halil Hoxha) which have been unknown until today and will be published for the first time and in several issues by Memorie.al. From the documents in question, it is noted that since March 4, 1981, (when the spontaneous protests of student youth in Pristina first began), until April 3, when Enver Hoxha held a working meeting with Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu and Ramiz Ali on the events in Kosovo, that is, for a month in a row, there has been complete silence and no meeting of the Political Bureau or the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Albanian People's Party has been held, that is, no reaction from the senior leadership of the Albanian People's Party and official Tirana

Likewise, what is noticeable in these documents is the panic that has seized the main leader of communist Albania, Enver Hoxha, who has been ambivalent and undecided about the stance that official Tirana should take on the events in Kosovo, so much so that in another conversation in the Party House on April 5, 1981 with "leadership comrades" (Mehmet Shehu, Adil Çarçani, Hekuran Isai, Kadri Hazbiu, Pali Miska, Spiro Koleka, Rita Marko, Pilo Peristeri, Simon Stefani and Qiriako Mihali, Nedin Hoxha and Behar Shtylla), where they went for coffee, or to play cards, billiards, etc., Enver asks them: "What do you think about the recent events in Kosovo and what should we do? Should we take a stance and be concerned, or not?" Likewise, during another short conversation that Enver Hoxha had in his office with Ramiz Ali about a month later (on May 13, 1981), he told him: "It seems to me that our subordinates should also think about the events in Kosovo and not expect them to think only about me"!

Regarding these etc., we are familiar with these archival documents which belong to the period April-June 1981, where Enver Hoxha held several conversations and meetings, both with his two closest associates (Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu and the Secretary of the Central Committee, Ramiz Alia), as well as with the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which are published for the first time and with the relevant facsimiles by Memorie.al.

ARCHIVE DOCUMENT OF THE MEETING OF ENVER HOXHA WITH MEHMET SHEHU AND RAMIZ ALIN, ON APRIL 3, 1981, RELATED TO THE EVENTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS HELD IN KOSOVO.

REGARDING THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN KOSOVO, 3. IV. 1981

In the meeting with comrades Mehmet Shehu and Ramiz Alia, regarding the demonstrations and the situation created in Kosovo, comrade Enver made the following assessment:

1. We must analyze the events in Kosovo in a broad plan, first of all in relation to our country, the People's Socialist Republic of Albania. We know, and the Yugoslavs know this too, that our country is not involved, has no hand in the demonstrations that are taking place in Kosovo.

Our correct Marxist-Leninist policy has been and is to expand relations with Kosovo and other areas in Yugoslavia inhabited by Albanians, to help our brothers there as much as we can to gain as many of the rights recognized by the Yugoslav constitution as possible and to always keep alive and develop the feeling of the nation, language, customs, etc., to increase love for the People's Socialist Republic of Albania and our Party.

This just policy has yielded the results that we know, which we can consider satisfactory. We must not forget that all our enemies, imperialists, social-imperialists and others, have their eyes on socialist Albania, because this, with its just stances, with its consistent struggle, with the example it sets by consistently upholding Marxism-Leninism, is ruining the work of all the oppressors, exploiters and enemies of the peoples. Therefore, they are interested in liquidating socialist Albania. But how can they achieve this?

2. To attack it directly is difficult and very revealing for them. Therefore, they may think of achieving their goals by involving Albania in some important incident. From this point of view, the events in Kosovo may be instigated, or they may be used to provoke our country.

Imperialist, social-imperialist and other enemies think that the uprising of the people of Kosovo against the Tito regime could encourage Albania to intervene, to act, judging that the time has come to realize the unification of Kosovo with Albania.

And, if our Party takes this wrong step, they think, the enemies of socialist Albania will have the opportunity to intervene with weapons and realize their goals of annihilating this hearth of socialism, the People's Socialist Republic of Albania. But our Party and socialist state do not make this mistake, do not fall into these traps. In this matter we must be vigilant.

Now let's see more specifically who might be more interested in creating a critical situation in Yugoslavia in general, and in Kosovo in particular? Let's take them one by one. The Greeks and the Italians are not interested. Like them, the Americans do not want Yugoslavia to weaken or disintegrate for the time being. So it can be ruled out that they have a hand in the events in Kosovo.

What about the Soviets? It could be. However, it is difficult to fully accept this version. First, because (we do not know), it is incredible that the Titoites gave the Soviets such a free hand that they organized such a large network of spies that it would be able to stir up the masses.

Then we do not know that the Soviets have made so many economic investments in Kosovo, which would favor to some extent their influence and presence there. Secondly, because Kosovars, as good Albanian patriots that they are, find it difficult to trust the Russians, whether historically they have been pro-Serbs and anti-Albanians, or because the Russians are now known as fierce sworn enemies of Socialist Albania and the Party of Labor of Albania.

3. Reasoning in this way, given what we know about the situation in Kosovo, we can conclude that it is more likely that the demonstrations and mass revolt in Kosovo are the work of internal forces. From what we have followed the development of Kosovo and the positions of various elements, it appears that there is a group of people there, mainly senior leaders who are satisfied with the existing situation, who see Kosovo as connected to Serbia and as its tail. Yesterday's speech by Xhavit Nimani is a reflection of this comment.

There is then another group of people in Kosovo, who can be called moderates, who are for the development of Kosovo, using the rights that the Yugoslav constitution gives it and thus, step by step and under favorable conditions, to achieve something more. These are measured in the steps they take, but, it seems, they are neither organized nor have any particular influence on the masses.

There are also various groups in Kosovo, from those called Marxist-Leninists to other exalted elements who are in favor of actions. It is precisely these who may be the instigators of the demonstrations and events that are taking place there.

These people (or any of them) may have been encouraged and incited (prompters operate in many subtle ways) by Soviet agents, just as they may have been encouraged by the Croats, and even by the Serbs, for actions like these that are taking place, being told that now is the right time, etc., etc.

Why might they be encouraged by the Soviets or the Croats, of course. But why by the Serbs? They might want to use this opportunity to attack the Albanians, to oppress and terrorize them, and to take advantage of it to curb to some extent the ties and relations that have developed so widely between Kosovo and the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

They know that, despite the fact that Albania has no hand in these events, in the demonstrations and revolts in Kosovo, in the patriotism that the youth and people of Kosovo are expressing, the influence of Albania, of the Party of Labor of Albania, is present, which has grown greatly there thanks to our fair policy and the relations we have established with Kosovo.

4. This is how I think about the events taking place in Kosovo. How should these events, the demonstrations and the revolt of the youth and people of Kosovo be evaluated? Despite the fact that today's conditions are not favorable for achieving maximum results, despite the fact that the Titoists will suppress and take measures against the Kosovar patriots, these demonstrations are positive and will exert a positive effect.

On the international level, they show the world once again that Tito's Yugoslavia is rotten, that it is not as it appears, as a "paradise" for the nations that comprise it, but a hell, where populations of different nationalities are oppressed and exploited.

This confirms everything our Party has said about Titoism, Yugoslavia and self-administration. On the other hand, again on an international level, these demonstrations once again raised before the whole world the problem of Kosovo, the injustice that has been done to our people.

Internally, these demonstrations will further increase the fighting spirit and patriotism of the Albanians of Kosovo and other areas inhabited by Albanians in Yugoslavia. They will also serve the Serbs and Titoists, because; "here we are, the Albanians, who do not agree with this situation and, when the day comes, we will know how to gain our rights by force, because we are not afraid of your tanks or your planes".

What should we do in this situation? Be vigilant. We cannot come to the direct aid of our Kosovar brothers. This, for all that I have said, is neither advisable nor useful. Nothing good would come to either Kosovo or the People's Socialist Republic of Albania; on the contrary, we would fall into the trap of our enemies. But indirectly we must help our Kosovar brothers.

5. Our Ambassador in Belgrade should be instructed to meet at the Foreign Secretariat and, first of all, consider as discriminatory the fact that, while ambassadors of several other countries have been officially informed about the events taking place in Kosovo, the Albanian ambassador, of a neighboring country, who is interested in blood brothers, has not been informed at all by the Foreign Secretariat of Yugoslavia.

Secondly, to advise Yugoslavs to be cautious towards the demonstrators, not to follow the path of attacks and repression, which is neither in the best interest of the Kosovar people nor of Yugoslavia itself.

Thirdly, to recommend that the legitimate demands presented by Kosovars, and derived from the Constitution of Yugoslavia, should be met. / Memorie.al