At a time when national security is challenged every day by cyberattacks, hybrid warfare and the theft of massive data (Big Data), Albania is facing a dangerous institutional and legal paradox. On the one hand, with the latest legal changes in July 2026, the Albanian state has expanded the powers of the State Intelligence Service (SHISH) to deal with technological and asymmetric threats. Including the elusive concept of “internal stability”, which we have discussed earlier (See: Gazeta Panorama Online, “SHISH pa Kufij, Demokraci pa Garanci”, July 4, 2026). On the other hand, the criminal framework that is supposed to punish the violation of these vital interests has remained a relic of the Cold War.

One only has to read Articles 213 and 214 of the Albanian Criminal Code to understand the depth of this structural failure. According to these provisions, the disclosure of secret information constitutes a criminal offense only if it is given to “a foreign power” and exclusively with the intention of “violating the independence of the country.” This anachronistic formulation leaves the Albanian state legally disarmed in the face of the reality of the 21st century.

In the era of artificial intelligence and hybrid operations, espionage is no longer carried out only by traditional states, but by terrorist organizations, global hacker syndicates, corporations, or non-state actors (proxies). Most importantly: their goal is almost never the elimination of the “territorial independence” of the Republic of Albania. When an espionage network steals TIMS system data, compromises the communications of security institutions, or sells the secrets of NATO protocols, the goal may be financial gain, political blackmail, or the destabilization of institutions.

The legislator has established the barrier of “Specific Purpose” (Dolus Specialis). The phrase “to undermine the independence of the country” requires the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the specific purpose of the spy was to destroy the independence of Albania. In today’s reality, an informant may sell state secrets to a foreign service simply for financial gain, for ideological reasons, or to blackmail a political figure. He may have no interest in undermining the “independence” (territorial or legal sovereignty) of the country.

Unlike our Western allies, such as the United States, which punishes any action that constitutes an advantage for another nation, or Sweden, which recently criminalized espionage that harms the interests of the alliance – we continue to seek evidence of classic invasions. Albania does not explicitly criminalize even the information of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. So, if NATO data is compromised from our territory, is Albania’s “independence” really being violated?

The lack of espionage convictions in Albania does not indicate that we are an “island of peace” or that foreign services have bypassed our country. It is evidence of our institutional blindness and powerlessness. If the Albanian state had modern instruments and the will to crack down on illegal influences, we would have seen at least one exemplary judicial process in the last decade, while the Balkans continues to be an open battlefield of hybrid warfare. When global players move resources to buy influence and compromise strategic decision-making in Tirana, our security and justice structures close their eyes. This silence is not purity. It is the fear of “Pandora’s boxes” that would reveal how deeply entrenched our state structure is.

This dangerous legal vacuum takes on even more dramatic proportions when we reflect on the deep crisis that has recently engulfed the SHISH institution itself. When the service's leadership itself is caught in a web of compromises and scandals due to clientelistic appointments without proper meritocratic vetting, the very essence of national security is compromised from within.

The real risk, in fact, is not that the case goes to court and is dismissed. The risk is that the prosecution is discouraged from the very beginning from filing charges of “Espionage”. Because of this absurd formulation of “independence”, prosecutors choose the easiest path to success. They file charges of “Disclosure of secret acts or data” (Article 295/a) or “Abuse of office”, which are punishable by only 1 to 5 years in prison.

If the law fails to deter foreign agents, our last line of defense remains the integrity of the intelligence institutions themselves. But when this institution itself is seized by clientelism and the lack of meritocracy, the decline of national security is complete. Today, modern states are not simply patching up traditional espionage articles. They are adopting entirely new laws on National Security and digital espionage. Perhaps a whole new chapter in the Criminal Code dedicated specifically to “Hybrid Threats and Information Security” will be needed. Of course, any legal tightening must include ironclad protective clauses for whistleblowers and investigative journalists. The dividing line must be clear: revealing a secret in the name of the public interest to denounce state corruption protects the Republic, while its covert transfer to foreign actors endangers it.

It is true that serious secret services rarely send spies to the doors of public courts. To protect their resources, methods and technology, the standard doctrine prefers silent neutralization or diplomatic expulsion (declaration of persona non grata). But this shield of “operational secrecy” applies more to foreign agents. When it comes to our citizens, high-ranking officials, military personnel, diplomats, decision-makers, keepers of state secrets, etc., who are recruited by foreign powers, trial for high treason is not an option, but a vital state obligation. The fact that in Albania we have not had a single Albanian citizen convicted of espionage in decades does not prove the silent professionalism of our security institutions. On the contrary, it reveals a bitter truth: our counterintelligence infrastructure is paralyzed to strike at those who sell out the state from within, turning “state secret” into an alibi for the inviolability of deviant elites.

Modern espionage cannot be fought with yesterday's laws and institutions captured today. The Criminal Code must be urgently amended to punish the violation of "national security and the strategic interests of our alliances", erasing the absurd threshold of "violation of independence". However, it is not enough to patch up the Criminal Code when you have no will to implement it. It is the same as buying a sophisticated lock for a door that you always leave open. If the state does not possess precise legal instruments to protect its information and the political will to cleanse the security institutions of militancy and incompetence, then the fine words about modernization remain simply a facade that hides the decline of the Republic.

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