The demographic crisis is becoming one of the biggest long-term risks for the Western Balkans. The region is not only losing population, but mainly young, educated and working-age people, precisely the groups on which economic growth, the labor market and pension financing rely.

The analysis "The Silent Killer of the Western Balkans: Demographic Decline and Human Capital Loss", published by the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA), argues that this situation is created by the weakness of institutions, corruption, lack of public trust, and limited economic and professional prospects.

Declining birth rates, aging, and emigration are all acting in tandem. Fewer young people mean fewer parents in the future, while the emigration of the working-age population further reduces births, the labor force, and the number of contributors to social systems.

Serbia lost 437 thousand inhabitants in a decade

Serbia represents one of the cases where the natural population decline is deepening. In 2024, the country recorded 60,845 births and 98,230 deaths, losing 37,385 inhabitants just from the difference between births and deaths. The fertility rate was 1.63 children per woman, well below the level of 2.1 needed to replace the population.

During the period 2015-2024, Serbia lost 437,205 inhabitants due to natural decline, not including the effects of emigration. This is equivalent to the disappearance of two medium-sized cities in a decade. According to other estimates cited in the analysis, Serbia has lost nearly a million inhabitants since 1991. The continued loss of the skilled population is reducing the base of future employees, professionals and contributors.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, fertility at its lowest level

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 26,037 births and 36,423 deaths were recorded in 2024, resulting in a natural decrease of 10,386 inhabitants.

The official fertility rate fell to 1.17 children per woman, the lowest level recorded in the country. However, the report notes that estimates vary by source and that the World Bank calculates the indicator at around 1.5.

Measuring the true extent of the crisis is made difficult by institutional fragmentation, different statistical methodologies, and the lack of complete data on migration. For this reason, the population decline may be even deeper than what official statistics indicate.

Bosnia and Herzegovina also ranks among the countries with the largest diaspora in relation to the number of population.

Albania lost 1.2% of its population in one year

In Albania, natural decline and emigration are reinforcing each other. According to data cited in the report, the country's population reached about 2.36 million inhabitants in 2024, shrinking by 1.2% compared to the previous year.

Natural growth is very limited, while emigration remains high. The median age has increased to around 44.3 years, demonstrating rapid aging and a shrinking working-age population.

Albania ranks among the countries with the largest diaspora in relation to population. The scale of emigration is simultaneously reducing the current workforce and the capacity for future population renewal.

Kosovo loses population despite natural increase

Kosovo has the youngest population in the region, with an average age of around 32 years, but even this demographic structure is not enough to avoid population shrinkage.

According to the 2024 census, the resident population was about 1.59 million inhabitants. During the year, the natural increase was positive by 10,888 people.

However, 37,451 people left the country, while 9,038 entered. The negative migration balance of 28,413 people completely overturned the natural increase. As a result, the resident population shrank by 17,525 inhabitants within a year.

The case of Kosovo shows that emigration can neutralize even a still positive ratio between births and deaths.

North Macedonia, population shrank by 5%

The population of North Macedonia was estimated at around 1.82 million inhabitants at the end of 2024, marking a 5% decrease compared to 2014.

In 2024, 16,061 births and 20,201 deaths were recorded, while the fertility rate was around 1.48 children per woman.

The country recorded a slight positive migration balance of 799 people, but this was not enough to neutralize the natural decline. About 18% of the population is over 65 years old and the median age has exceeded 40 years.

Montenegro maintains population thanks to immigrants

Montenegro is the only country in the Western Balkans where the population remains more or less stable. This is not only related to natural indicators, but mainly to the positive migration balance, supported by the arrival of Russian and Turkish citizens.

In 2024, the number of births was only slightly higher than the number of deaths, while the fertility rate was 1.8 children per woman, the highest in the region, but still below replacement level.

The average age of the population is just under 40. However, people over 65 make up 17% of the population, or about 105,700 people. This means that Montenegro will also face pressure on pensions, healthcare and the labor market, while the number of women of reproductive age is expected to continue to decline.

Immigration is costing economies up to 3% of GDP

The economic consequences go beyond the lack of labor. Countries in the region finance the education of young people from the public budget, but many of them leave after completing their studies and pay taxes to the economies of the host countries. In this way, the Western Balkans finance the formation of human capital that is then used by more developed economies.

According to estimates cited by HIIA, emigration could cost Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia up to 3% of GDP. For Albania, the cost of each person who emigrates is estimated at around 15 thousand euros, with a total annual loss of approximately 559 million euros. In Montenegro, the cost exceeds 21 thousand euros per emigrant and around 70 million euros per year. For North Macedonia, the loss is estimated at around 16 thousand euros per person and 333 million euros per year.

Similar estimates have not been made for other countries, but the analysis suggests that the costs could be even higher, given the size of their economies and populations. Remittances support household consumption and income, but do not compensate for the loss of human capital. Most of them are spent on consumption and only a limited part is used for productive investment.

They don't just leave for higher salaries.

Differences in income and living standards remain important drivers of emigration, but they are not the only reasons.

According to the analysis, young people also leave due to corruption, nepotism, the weakness of the rule of law and a lack of trust in public institutions. Insecurity about professional development and the belief that personal connections are more important than skills push many young people to seek a future abroad.

Distrust also extends to public education and healthcare systems. When citizens pay taxes but are forced to turn to private services, dissatisfaction and lack of trust in the state deepen.

EU integration may initially accelerate the exodus

One of the paradoxes of European integration is that removing barriers to employment and movement could accelerate emigration from the Western Balkans.

This would help EU countries, which are themselves facing an aging and labor shortage. But for the region, a new wave of departures would deepen the shortage of workers and professionals. According to the study, Croatia shows how this process can develop. From EU membership in 2013 to 2023, about 389 people emigrated from the country, a significant loss for a population of about 3.8 million.

Since 2022, Croatia has recorded a positive migration balance, mainly thanks to workers from Nepal, India, the Philippines and Bangladesh. At the same time, around 10 Croatians are estimated to return each year, driven by rising living standards and improving economic prospects.

The Croatian case shows that integration may deepen emigration in the short term, but in the longer term it may create the conditions for the return of part of the diaspora, through improved wages, infrastructure, and institutions.

Birth bonuses are not enough

Governments in the region have tried to respond to the decline in births mainly with financial payments and bonuses. According to the analysis, direct transfers have limited impact because they are short-term and do not change the economic and institutional conditions that influence the decision to start a family.

Financial support should be accompanied by sustainable employment, affordable housing, more childcare, quality education, and opportunities for reconciling work and family life. But even these policies will not be enough if trust in institutions is not increased and fair opportunities for professional development are not created.

If current trends continue, the Western Balkans will have fewer workers and taxpayers, more pensioners and social spending, and a weaker capacity to attract investment. In this way, demographic decline risks becoming a self-reinforcing process: weaker economies encourage new emigration, while emigration further weakens the region's economies./ Monitor