Few diplomatic visits encapsulate the complexity of today's geopolitical balances as clearly as Volodymyr Zelensky's to Belgrade. The Ukrainian president, whose country has been battling Russian aggression for years, was hosted by Aleksandar Vučić, the leader of a Serbia that maintains close relations with Moscow and refuses to join Western sanctions against it.
And yet, Belgrade continues to support Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. What at first glance seems like a contradiction actually reveals a colder logic: that of strategic interest.
However, the paradox is only apparent. In reality, Belgrade offered an almost textbook illustration of how realpolitik works when interests become more important than affinities.
Raymond Aron wrote in Paix et guerre entre les nations that his aim was to understand “the implicit logic of relations between politically organized collectivities.” It is precisely this logic that must be sought in Belgrade. Not who loves whom, but who needs whom.
Vučić reaffirmed Serbia’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including the territories occupied by Russia since 2014. Zelensky, on the other hand, did not change Ukraine’s position on Kosovo. Belgrade publicly thanked Kiev for this position. The two presidents also talked about a free trade agreement, cooperation in energy, infrastructure, and the future reconstruction of Ukraine. Here the first paradox appears.
Serbia defends Ukraine's territorial integrity against Russia, while Ukraine, by not recognizing Kosovo, gives Belgrade a diplomatic argument that Serbia considers essential for protecting its territorial integrity.
For Kosovo, this is a clash with the limits of normative solidarity. Pristina has clearly lined up in support of Ukraine. But moral solidarity does not automatically produce diplomatic reciprocity. Kiev does not see Kosovo from Pristina. It sees it from Crimea.
Recognizing Kosovo would touch on one of the most delicate issues of the territorial doctrine on which Ukraine builds its argument against Russian annexations. This does not make Kosovo equivalent to the occupied Ukrainian territories; the histories, legal context, and circumstances are fundamentally different. But diplomacy does not operate solely on legal analogy. It also operates on the fear of precedents and how an adversary might use them.
The second paradox is even stronger.
Serbia has not joined the Western sanctions regime against Russia. However, there have been reports for years that significant quantities of Serbian-made ammunition, exported to buyers in third countries, have ended up in Ukraine. An estimate previously reported by the Financial Times put the value at around 800 million euros, while Vučić had acknowledged that the figure was generally credible, insisting that Serbia did not sell the ammunition directly to Ukraine or Russia.
During the last visit, he reiterated that Serbia does not provide direct military support and said that the issue of ammunition had not been discussed with Zelensky.
For Moscow, this is a difficult contradiction. For Belgrade, it is a space for maneuver. Machiavelli reminds us in The Prince that politics rarely offers choices without risk; the skill lies in knowing the borders and exploiting the space that is created between them. Vučić seems to have made this principle the axis of Serbian diplomacy. Rather than choosing definitively between Moscow and the West, he maintains sufficient ties with each side to make Serbia useful to both. Ambiguity, in this case, is not a lack of orientation: it is a negotiating tool.
This brings us to Hans Morgenthau. For classical realism, the compass of international politics is “interest defined in terms of power.” Power here is not to be understood only as military or economic size. For a medium-sized state, power can also be the ability to make itself needed.
Serbia is trying to do just that. For Moscow, it remains one of the few European partners that has not imposed sanctions. For Brussels, it is a candidate country, whose position is crucial for the stability of the Western Balkans. For Kiev, it is a state that formally defends the territorial integrity of Ukraine and with which broader economic cooperation is now sought.
This does not mean that Vučić’s strategy is limitless. The balance works only as long as the other parties consider Serbian ambiguity more beneficial than costly. A reversal of the war in Ukraine, stronger European pressure, or a serious regional crisis could narrow this space.
But Belgrade also offers an important lesson for Tirana and Pristina.
The lesson is not to imitate Serbia. Albania and Kosovo have no interest in inventing a “two-chair” policy. Albania’s Euro-Atlantic orientation and Kosovo’s strategic anchorage in the West are assets. But belonging to a camp and weight within that camp are not the same thing.
For Albania, the challenge is to transform Euro-Atlantic credibility into strategic usefulness: through its position on the Adriatic, security infrastructure, transport and energy corridors, connection with Kosovo, and its role in the new European architecture.
For Kosovo, the question is even more existential. Support from allies remains vital, but recognition diplomacy cannot rely on moral capital alone. Pristina must also build strategic capital: to show not only why Kosovo deserves support, but why a consolidated and integrated Kosovo is an asset to European security and stability.
Herein lies perhaps the most important lesson of Zelensky's visit.
Serbia is turning ambiguity into diplomatic capital. Albania and Kosovo have no reason to imitate it: their challenge is to turn Euro-Atlantic clarity into strategic weight. Because influence does not only come from the ability to stand between two camps, but also from the ability to become indispensable within the camp you have chosen.
In the Europe that the war in Ukraine is reshaping, alliances determine the orientation, but not necessarily the weight, of a state.
Machiavelli, Morgenthau, and Aron, each in their own time, remind us that the weight of a state is determined both by the interests it represents and the value it creates for others. For Albania and Kosovo, this means turning their clear Western orientation into an asset that partners not only value, but also consider necessary.
Being on the right side is not enough. You also have to become necessary.
