The war with Tehran is overshadowing a crucial meeting that US President Donald Trump is expected to hold with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing this week. Iran is expected to be one of the most sensitive issues on the agenda of the meeting.

Trump is expected to arrive in Beijing on May 13 and meet with China on May 14-15, after his planned visit earlier this year was postponed due to the conflict with Tehran.

Senior US officials say Trump intends to directly challenge China over China's economic and technological ties to Iran, including oil purchases and alleged shipments of dual-use goods.

In an interview with Radio Free Europe, Ken Moriyasu, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, said Beijing could tactically help reduce tensions but would resist any efforts that could threaten the survival of the Iranian regime, which he described as central to China's long-term Eurasian strategy.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: With Trump expected to challenge China on Iran and Washington introducing new sanctions targeting Iranian oil networks linked to China, how important is this moment in US-China diplomacy regarding Tehran?

Ken Moriyasu: I'm sure Trump will ask Xi Jinping for help on Iran, and I'm sure China is as interested in seeing this war end as Trump is in ending it.

But I'm also very sure that Xi doesn't want regime change in Tehran. So while he might be willing to push Tehran to reach some kind of compromise, I'm very sure that Xi will resist any pressure from Trump to punish Iran in a way that could lead to regime change.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: When you look at China's relationship with Iran today, how much influence does Beijing really have over Tehran?

Ken Moriyasu: The relationship continues, but we need to understand it through China's long-term strategy and the importance that Iran has within it.

If regime change occurs in Tehran and the country becomes pro-American, pro-Western, and turns away from China, this directly conflicts with China's long-term continental strategy.

In the last 15 years, China has tried hard to limit its dependence on maritime trade routes, especially for energy, because oil tankers must pass through strategic points like the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, China has oriented itself towards land pipelines, and within this continental strategy, Iran occupies the southern flank, or southern anchor.

If Iran becomes pro-Western, it would disrupt China’s land links to the Middle East and Europe. It would complicate the energy logistics and military corridors associated with the Belt and Road Initiative, and it would undermine the idea of ​​a continuous Eurasian interior insulated from American military power, something China has been trying to create for the past 15 years.

Radio Free Europe: Given the close economic ties with Iran, particularly in energy exports and oil purchases, does this translate into significant political influence for Beijing?

Ken Moriyasu: This gives Iran more influence than China.

If Iran understands China's long-term strategy, then Tehran has leverage. And the United States must understand China's policy and recognize that China will never support policies that could lead to regime change.

This also relates to Taiwan. As long as the United States maintains strategic control over China's energy imports through the Straits of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz, China cannot take Taiwan by force.

Even if China were able to militarily invade Taiwan, the US would be able to strangle the Chinese economy by blocking those routes.

So what China is trying to do first is to create a continental corridor that protects it from American retaliation. Once this Eurasian refuge or fortress is completed, then Beijing would have more options regarding Taiwan.
I'm not saying that China will invade Taiwan if this corridor is completed, but it would certainly give Beijing more strategic flexibility.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: If Trump asks Xi to use that influence on Iran, what kind of response do you expect from Beijing?

Ken Moriyasu: China is simultaneously pursuing two long-term goals: it wants to move away from maritime trade routes and it also wants to move away from its own dependence on oil.

That's why China is aggressively encouraging a shift from gasoline-powered cars to electric vehicles, powered by electricity generated by nuclear power or coal. Much of that coal comes from domestic sources or from Mongolia, which is protected from U.S. military intervention.

However, China hasn't gotten there yet, so it still needs oil. That means this war and the rise in oil prices are hurting China for now.

In the long term, however, China wants to limit its dependence on both shipping and oil itself.
Beijing needs stability for the foreseeable future, but it has no interest in helping Trump gain control of the Strait of Hormuz or supporting regime change in Tehran. This is not in China's long-term strategic interest.

Radio Free Europe: In this context, do you see China playing more of a quiet diplomatic role behind the scenes, or remaining cautious publicly?

Ken Moriyasu: Any role China will play will be tactical, not strategic. I'm very sure of that.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: As Washington deals with Iran, Ukraine, and strategic competition with China simultaneously, how do you think policymakers balance all of these challenges at the same time?

Ken Moriyasu: This is yet another reason why Xi can help tactically, but not strategically.

The reality is that tensions between Washington and Tehran are not bad for Beijing. If Washington is distracted by a war involving Iran, it takes attention away from Taiwan. That gives China more time to prepare.

So, a certain level of tension between Washington and Tehran actually serves China's strategic interests.

But in the long term, China's plan is to first create continental corridors through which it can secure energy and trade without American interference. This is the first phase, perhaps over the next decade.
China would then be able to project power more confidently toward coastal maritime areas and potentially consider operations against Taiwan later. The United States needs to understand what China is trying to do.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: At what point could the crisis become serious enough for Beijing to act more decisively, whether diplomatically or strategically?

Ken Moriyasu: It is reported that China has strategic oil reserves that can last about four months.

As that deadline approaches, Beijing will face more pressure to provide alternative routes or work with Washington and Tehran to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. But there is still some time before China reaches that point.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Trump once postponed this visit because of Iran. Could Iran be one of the defining issues of the meeting, even beyond trade and the broader US-China relationship?
Ken Moriyasu: In a broader view, the US-China great power competition is actually a race for control of Eurasia.

From China's perspective, it wants uninterrupted access to Central Asian energy markets and trade routes to Europe without American interference.

The United States does not necessarily need to dominate Central Asia itself. But it should thwart China's efforts to the extent that Beijing never feels absolutely certain that Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Turkey are entirely within its sphere, because once China has that certainty, it will have a greater ability to project power outward, especially toward Taiwan.

The American strategy should be to deny China that absolute security.

In this sense, Iran is part of this larger competition. Iran is part of the refuge or fortress that China and Russia are trying to build in the Eurasian heartland.

But Iran itself is not the defining issue in the US-China race. All of Eurasia is.

Radio Free Europe: Could this meeting mark a turning point in the way Washington and Beijing engage in major international security crises in the future?

Ken Moriyasu: No, absolutely not. China and the United States have fundamentally different visions for Eurasia, and that competition will continue despite this summit.

Any tactical agreement they reach: a soybean deal, a Boeing deal, or whatever, doesn't change the broader structure.
The real structure is the competition of great powers for the Eurasian heartland.

Radio Free Europe: Some Republican lawmakers argue that Trump should publicly criticize China for its behind-the-scenes support for Iran. How widespread is that view in Washington right now?

Ken Moriyasu: Any support China gives Iran behind the scenes is tactical. It's not the fundamental issue.

The fundamental issue is that China needs the regime in Tehran for its continental strategy. Whether senators are angry about the behind-the-scenes help is secondary to the much larger strategic reality./REL