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Five months into the war with Iran, Trump faces a difficult dilemma: How to turn the conflict into a victory?
Five months into the war with Iran, Donald Trump is facing a far more complex problem than he could have anticipated at the start of the conflict. The US retains vast military superiority and the ability to inflict severe damage on Iran, but Washington has yet to find a way to end the war on terms that could be presented as a clear American victory.
The contradiction has become especially apparent in the past week. Trump has threatened new, massive attacks on Iran, but then postponed them. At the same time, the US president has stated that negotiations with Tehran are progressing, while the Iranian side has questioned whether direct talks are actually taking place.
Meanwhile, another crisis front has shifted to the Strait of Hormuz, a point where Iran has a significant asymmetric advantage. Thus, a war that began with Iran's nuclear program at its center has now forced Washington to confront the problem of navigational security in the Persian Gulf.
The attack that didn't happen
Last week began with the region on the brink of another major escalation. Trump had warned for days that the US could launch a new attack on Iran.
But on Saturday evening he announced that the operation would be postponed if an agreement was reached quickly to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz and address what Washington considers an Iranian nuclear threat.
The decision came at a time when American allies in the Persian Gulf were also seeking to reduce tensions.
Trump had held a conversation with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have direct reasons to fear escalation.
These countries are located near Iranian missile capabilities, and any new conflict could threaten the Gulf's cities, refineries, ports, desalination plants, and energy infrastructure.
The paradox is great: the countries that for years have sought a tougher policy towards Tehran are now trying to contain a new American escalation to protect their interests.
Washington and Tehran, two different versions of negotiations
Over the past week, American and Iranian statements have often presented two different realities.
Trump said he had had a full day of negotiations with Iran and that the talks had been successful. But at the same time, he warned that Tehran would face serious consequences if it withdrew from the process.
Qatar has also spoken of progress in mediation efforts, while Iran has rejected the US description that direct negotiations are taking place.
In this diplomatic battle, both sides have opposing interests.
Trump wants to show that military pressure has forced Iran to negotiate. Tehran, on the other hand, wants any agreement to be presented as the result of Iranian resistance, not American pressure.
But after the public statements, more concrete negotiations are taking place, with the mediation of Oman. At their center is the most pressing issue of the moment: the Strait of Hormuz.
What does Iran want?
One of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations relates to how maritime traffic in Hormuz will be managed.
The proposals being discussed envision a greater role for Iran in controlling and monitoring ships entering the Persian Gulf, but significant disagreements still exist over the concrete mechanism.
This puts the White House in a difficult dilemma.
If Trump accepts a deal that gives Tehran new powers over one of the world's most important energy transport arteries, Iran could present this as a victory.
If the agreement is not reached, uncertainty in Hormuz could continue and maritime traffic could remain far from normal levels.
The issue of transit fees also remains controversial. Iran has demanded fees that could amount to 5–7% of the cargo value, while the mediating parties have discussed lower figures. The US opposes this idea.
Even if a political agreement is reached, an immediate return to maritime traffic is not guaranteed. Insurers, shipping companies and traders will need to assess whether the risk is still acceptable.
Hormuz, Iran's most powerful asymmetric weapon
Data on maritime traffic shows the impact of the crisis.
From Monday to Thursday, only 33 ships passed through the Strait of Hormuz, compared to 50 during the same period the previous week. Only six crude oil tankers left the Persian Gulf.
Before the war, around 130–140 ships passed through Hormuz in a week.
This is precisely where Tehran's asymmetric advantage lies.
Iran doesn't need to defeat the US Navy or physically block every ship. It just needs to create a level of uncertainty that makes shipowners, insurance companies, and oil traders consider the risk greater than the gain.
Iran is trying to encompass the entire Gulf
Tehran is also trying to increase the cost of any new American attack.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has contacted Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and Pakistan, warning that a new attack on critical Iranian infrastructure could trigger retaliation against energy facilities and strategic infrastructure in Gulf countries.
Iran's message is clear: Arab countries cannot allow their territory to be used for an American war against Tehran while they themselves bear the cost of escalation.
For Iran, this is a way to use its relative military weakness to increase pressure on US allies and, ultimately, on the White House itself.
The Mecca Agreement and a new security architecture
The trilateral defense agreement signed in Mecca by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan should also be seen in this context.
According to the agreement, an armed attack on one of the three countries will be considered an attack on all.
The agreement brings together three powers of considerable weight: the economic might of Saudi Arabia, the powerful Turkish military, and Pakistan, the only nuclear-armed state in the Muslim world.
It would not be accurate to characterize the agreement as an anti-American alliance. All three countries have important relations with Washington, and Turkey is a member of NATO.
However, the timing of the agreement is significant.
Successive conflicts in the region have increased concerns in the Gulf countries about the reliability of traditional American security guarantees.
The Mecca Agreement can be seen as an attempt to create a regional security mechanism and reduce exclusive dependence on Washington.
This is one of the greatest ironies of the conflict: an American intervention intended to strengthen the US position in the Middle East could accelerate the creation of a new regional architecture, where local states demand more autonomy in security matters.
Another problem for the US: military reserves
Beyond diplomacy and Hormuz, Washington is facing another problem: the cost of a long war.
The US remains far more militarily powerful than Iran. But maintaining this operational level for months is consuming significant ammunition reserves.
According to data reported by Reuters, the US military has used a very large proportion of ATACMS and Precision Strike Missile missiles during the conflict. Meanwhile, a significant portion of the Tomahawk reserves have also been consumed.
The situation is also worrying in air defense. Expert assessments have shown high consumption of Patriot and THAAD interceptors.
Trump has acknowledged that while the US has very large stockpiles of some types of ammunition, supplies of other weapons are more limited. The US administration has meanwhile announced efforts to increase production of Patriot and Tomahawk missiles.
The problem for Washington is not just whether it can strike Iran again. It can.
The more difficult question is how long it can continue this pace without weakening the reserves it might need in other potential conflicts in Europe or the Indo-Pacific.
Trump's dilemma
After five months of war, the picture is increasingly complex.
The US has overwhelming military superiority, but that superiority has not yet produced a clear path to ending the conflict. Iran, though much weaker conventionally, has found ways to increase the economic, political, and strategic costs of continuing the war.
Hormuz has become Tehran's strongest card. Washington's allies in the Persian Gulf are demanding de-escalation, while American stockpiles of some munitions are coming under pressure.
For Trump, the challenge is no longer simply to win another military battle.
The challenge is to find a way to end the war and present it as a victory, without giving Iran the opportunity to claim that five months of war have brought it more influence in the region.
And this may be the American president's toughest battle.
