There is a figure that is generally known to every society: the usurer. Who, in fact, is not simply the one who lends money at interest. He is the one who waits. Who calculates weakness. Who knows that the real moment of profit is not when he takes the debt, but when the other fails to repay it on time.
At that moment the real game begins.
Interest increases. Conditions tighten. And the goal shifts from 'returning the debt' to 'taking everything that is left'. The more difficulties the debtor has, the higher the benefit becomes. This mechanism, which we usually associate with the informal economy, is today reflected in a worrying way in the Rama government. Which, instead of mitigating the effect of the price crisis, is benefiting from it.
Every increase in the price of fuel is not only a burden for the citizen, but also additional revenue for the budget. VAT increases automatically, without any reform, without any effort. Simply because the citizen pays more for the same thing.
And here arises the essential similarity.
Just as a moneylender does not ease the debt when the debtor is in difficulty, the state does not reduce the burden when the citizen is hit by a crisis. On the contrary, it maintains it, and even benefits from it. The fiscal burden on fuel in our country remains among the highest on the continent, and every liter that is expensive for the citizen is a liter more profitable for the state treasury.
According to data, in these weeks of crisis due to developments in the Middle East, the government has collected 4.5 million euros more in taxes than it normally received.
Meanwhile, the easing measures are minimal, temporary, and often delayed. Not as a political choice, but as a reaction to pressure. Only when the situation becomes tense, when transportation stops, when discontent surfaces, does a small concession come.
This too is part of the same logic.
The usurer does not let go because he suddenly wants to help. He only lets go when he risks losing control. Until that point, he waits. Just like the government that does not intervene to protect the citizen, but to preserve revenue.
Not to talk about how it spends it, but let's focus on the core of the problem, which is not just economic. It's a matter of incentives and public morality.
The additional revenue collected from price increases is not the result of development, nor of fiscal acumen. It is money that comes directly out of the pockets of citizens, simply because the market has become more expensive. In short, the citizen simply becomes poorer. In a normal approach, this money should be partially returned to soften the blow: through temporary tax cuts, support for transport, agriculture or low-income families.
But this does not happen.
Because in this model, the crisis is not seen as a burden for Albanians, but as an opportunity that should not be missed.
We are dealing with a government that behaves like a greedy creditor towards the poorest citizens in Europe.
The difference between a state and a usurer should be clear. The former exists to protect, to balance, to fairly distribute the burden of crises. The latter exists to profit from them.
When this difference is no longer discernible, the problem is no longer just economic. It is fundamental. And as such, pressure is no longer a solution that corrects governance, but an instrument that removes it.
This is what Albania needs today.
